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Q48There is broad consensus in the policy and academic communities regarding the importance of energy efficiency
actions in reducing energy requirements and subsequent greenhouse gas emissions. However, there is also a re-
quirement to understand the extent to which the technically possible energy savings from exogenously intro-
duced efficiency improvements might be eroded by knock-on economic effects which will further change
energy use. These effects strongly influence the way this ‘rebound’ phenomenon evolves over time. While
economy-wide drivers of rebound effects arewell understood, there has been some controversy over the relative
sizes of the short- and long-run rebound effects associated with energy efficiency improvements. Theoretical
analysis predicted that rebound effects would always be greater in the long run than in the short run. However,
numerical general equilibrium simulations have contradicted this result. A principal driver of the simulation re-
sults is the fully flexible response of energy supply prices to shifting demand. However, in practice, there are a
number of reasons for arguing that energy prices are likely to be ‘sticky’. In this paper we systematically explore
the effects of energy price stickiness on the evolution of rebound effects.Wefind that price stickiness is an impor-
tant determinant of the time path of rebound effects and of their relative size in the short and long runs. More-
over, there is considerable variation in the scale of rebound effects through time, especially where short-run
rebound is lower than its long-run counterpart. However, the most significant overall finding is that rebound re-
flects the system-wide interaction between energy producing and energy using sectors.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1 We do not explicitly model greenhouse gas emissions in this paper, but existing UK
energy generation and use is carbon intensive. Therefore, rebound effects, which limit
the effectiveness of energy efficiency improvements in reducing energy use, necessarily
diminish the effectiveness of this policy in cutting emissions.
2 In this literature, the short and long runs are conceptual time intervals. The short run is1. Introduction
Improving energy efficiency has historically been, and continues
to be, promoted as a cost-effective and efficient way to reduce energy
demand and greenhouse gas emissions (IEA, 2015; UNEP, 2014;
European Council, 2014). However, this view is increasingly accom-
panied by recognition of the need to understand the extent to which
technically possible energy savings associated with increased energy
efficiency might be eroded as a result of endogenous direct, indirect
and induced impacts on prices and incomes. These impacts affect,
and partially redirect, economic activity, making additional changes
to energy use through their effect on energy supply and demand. A
particular concern of the present paper is to understand how this ‘re-
bound’ phenomenon evolves over time, so as to aid the effective de-
sign of energy efficiency policy actions. We focus on the need to
understand how energy suppliers' price responses to efficiency-
driven demand changes may have important implications of interest
to – and potentially requiring coordinated planning across - policy. This is an open access article underregulators and industry. This is in terms of both the time adjustment
of wider economy impacts, and the total energy savings actually
delivered.1
Whilst the drivers of rebound are well understood (e.g. see
Turner, 2013, for a review), there has been some controversy
over the relative levels of the short- and long-run economy-
wide rebound effects accompanying energy efficiency improve-
ments. Theoretical analysis by Wei (2007) and Saunders (2008)
implied that the rebound effect would always be greater in the
long run than in the short run.2 However, Computable Generalan interval over which capital stocks are fixedwhilst in the long run capital stocks are op-
timally adjusted, both in aggregate and in their distribution across industries. As is appar-
ent from the results presented in Section 5 the actual number of simulation periods,
assumed to be a year, required for full adjustment depends on the form of the exogenous
shock and the size of the values taken by the adjustment parameters.
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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(2007) and Turner (2009) contradicted this analytical finding.3
Moreover, using econometric estimation Saunders (2013) found
that in aggregate the magnitude of historical direct rebound in
the US falls over time, but not for every sector.
The novelty of the paper is that we test, through simulation, how
far the higher short-run rebound result for increased energy effi-
ciency in production depends on the assumption of highly flexible
prices in the retail energy market. This analysis is carried out at an
aggregate and sector by sector level. We also track the evolution of
the rebound values as the economy adjusts to the efficiency shock
and find that where there is less than perfect price adjustment
non-monotonic changes can occur. As far as we are aware, this is
the first modelling of gradual price adjustment in a market for pro-
duced goods within a CGE context.
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines
the way in which energy efficiency improvement are conceptualised in
this paper and the cause and nature of long-run system-wide rebound
effects. Section 3 identifies the factors that determine the time path of
rebound values. Section 4 reviews the relevant literature on price stick-
iness. Section 5 presents our intertemporal, energy-economy-
environment CGE model of the UK economy, with a particular focus
on the treatment of price inflexibility. Section 6 reports the simulation
results and Section 7 gives brief conclusions.
2. Energy efficiency and the long-run system-wide rebound effect
In this paper we identify through simulation the impact of an im-
provement in the efficiency with which energy is used as an interme-
diate input in production, first across all sectors of the economy and
then sector by sector. For pedagogic reasons, this efficiency improve-
ment is taken to be exogenous and costless.4We define an increase in
energy efficiency as a technological or management improvement
that increases the energy services generated by each unit of physical
energy (Allan et al., 2007).5 This implies that in these functions the
energy in efficiency units, Ef, supplied by a given amount of energy
measured in physical (or natural) units, Ep, has increased. Specifi-
cally, if there has been a ψ proportionate increase in energy effi-
ciency:
E f ¼ 1þ ψð ÞEp ð1Þ
The implication of such an improvement in energy efficiency
is that firms can achieve the same level of production by using
the same amount of non-energy inputs, such as capital, labour
and other intermediates, but ψ less physical energy. However,
as a result of the efficiency improvement the price of energy
used as an intermediate in production, measured in efficiency
units, pfe, falls. Specifically, if the price in natural (physical)
units is ppe , then:
pef ¼
pep
1þ ψ ð2Þ
This change in the price of energy has substitution and output effects
which typically mean that the reduction in the use of energy is less than3 Turner (2009) argued that the limitation of the earlier theoretical analyses lay in their
assumption of a constant capital rental rate.
4 For rebound, the key aspect of an efficiency improvement is the reduction in unit in-
puts and therefore cost. Accordingly, we assume a costless implementation to the effi-
ciency change itself in order to focus the analysis. Previous work (e.g. Allan et al., 2007)
introduced implementation costs but such costs simply add noise in this context. Similarly
Lecca et al. (2017) analysed endogenous energy efficiency improvements, in the form of
learning curves, but this is outwith the scope of the standard rebound literature.
5 Just for complete clarity, in this case the efficiency improvement is limited to where
energy is used as an intermediate in production. There is no increase in the efficiency of
energy use in final consumption.would be expected from an engineering point of view. The extent of this
shortfall is called the rebound effect. In this case, the rebound in the use
of energy as an intermediate in production, RI, is:
RI ¼ 1þ
Ep;I
ψ
 
100 ð3Þ
In Eq. (3) Ep;I is the proportionate change in physical energy use in
production after the efficiency shock. If this equals the effective increase
in total energy productivity, so that− Ep;I ¼ ψ, then RI is zero and there is
no intermediate rebound. However, if the proportionate reduction in
energy use in production is less than the increase in efficiency, then re-
bound occurs.
The efficiency improvement affects energy use through two di-
rect - and a number of indirect - channels. The first direct channel
is the move to more energy-intensive – as measured in efficiency
units - production techniques. This reflects the corresponding fall
in the price of energy and the subsequent substitution towards en-
ergy. This means that the proportionate fall in energy use per unit
of output, when measured in natural units, is less than the efficiency
improvement. The second direct channel is the increased competi-
tiveness of all production sectors experiencing the efficiency im-
provement. This is driven by the reduced energy costs associated
with the direct efficiency increase which, if passed through to prod-
uct prices, increases the demand for the output of those sectors and
the embedded energy used as intermediate inputs.
Both the substitution and competitiveness effects increase the scale
of rebound. A further indirect effect comes through the fall in price of all
intermediate inputswhich results from the lower effective energy price.
This further stimulates competitiveness effects. These increases in sec-
toral outputs, driven by improved competitiveness, are again accompa-
nied by increases in the derived demand for the energy input. A fourth
factor, but one that influences rebound in the opposite direction, is the
reduction in energy use in the energy sector supply chain. Energy pro-
duction is itself energy intensive. A reduction in demand for energy in
all production sectors will further reduce the demand for energy in
the production of energy itself. This fourth channel therefore reduces
the rebound value.
Eq. (3) focusses solely on the use of energy in production but there
will also be impacts on the use of energy in final demand. These stem
from competitiveness changes that result from endogenous price
changes, and also from income changes that occur as economic activity
and total household income change. That is to say, although the change
in energy efficiency in production is exogenous, this will necessarily
have knock-on economic implications which will further affect energy
use. Total, economy-wide, rebound arising from a stimulus to energy ef-
ficiency in production is defined as RT. It implicitly incorporates general
equilibrium feedback effects on all energy uses, not just use in produc-
tion. It is defined as:
RT ¼ 1þ
Ep;T
α ψ
 
100 ð4Þ
In Eq. (4), Ep;T is the change in total physical energy use after all
agents have adjusted their behaviour to the technical energy effi-
ciency improvement and α is the base-year energy use in produc-
tion as a share of total energy use. Again, if the percentage
reduction in total energy use equals the effective increase in total
energy productivity, so that − Ep;T ¼ α ψ, then RT is zero and there
is no economy-wide rebound. Economy-wide rebound occurs if
the proportionate reduction in energy use is less than the effective
increase in efficiency.
The term ET=α ψ can be expressed as:
Ep;T
α ψ
¼ ΔEp;T
ψEp;I
¼ ΔEp;I þ ΔEp;C
ψEp;I
¼
Ep;I
ψ
þ ΔEp;C
ψEp;I
ð5Þ
6 It is important to stress that we are not discussing here price fluctuations in interna-
tional markets for basic sources of energy such as crude oil.
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tion. Substituting Eq. (5) into Eq. (4) and using Eq. (3) gives:
RT ¼ RI þ
ΔEp;C
ψEp;I
 
100 ð6Þ
Eq. (6) implies that the total economy-wide rebound, RT, will be
larger (smaller) than rebound in production, RI, if there is a net increase
(decrease) in energy use in household final consumption.
The changes in domestic energy used in household consumption are
driven by changes in product prices and household income. We expect
real household income to rise as the result of the increase in energy ef-
ficiency, which tends to increase rebound. Changes in price will depend
on the general equilibrium adjustments to prices together with the
change in technology. To the extent that energy prices fall relative to
other commodities, rebound will rise in response to price-sensitivity
in household consumption.
3. The time path of rebound effects
The discussion in Section 2 reflects the long-run changes that affect
the economy as a result of the energy efficiency shock. But as we
argue in the introduction, in the process of adjustment there will be en-
dogenous changes in the degree of over- and under-capacity across in-
dividual sectors of the economy. This will also affect the endogenous
product prices and therefore energy use. It is these effects which are
central to the present paper.
With an efficiency increase the positive substitution, competitive-
ness and real wage effects which lead to an increase in demand for en-
ergy, measured in efficiency units, are restricted in the short run by the
fixed capital stock in energy-using industries. Broadly, the argument un-
derpinning higher rebound in the long run rests on capital accumulation
relaxing this capacity constraint, stimulating economic activity gener-
ally, thereby increasing energy demand, measured in efficiency units,
and the size of the rebound effect.
However, capital adjustments with an opposite sign occur in
energy-producing industries, generating offsetting effects on en-
ergy demand through their impact on energy prices. In the short
run, a fall in energy demand, measured in natural units, results in
excess capacity in energy-producing sectors. This means that the
price of energy, measured in natural units, falls as the result of de-
clining capital rentals: put simply, there is reduced profitability in
the energy sectors in the face of declining energy demand. Energy
production is capital intensive so that the short-run fall in energy
price is large and goes some way to shore up short-run energy pro-
duction and sales.
Lower profitability leads to disinvestment over time in the en-
ergy sectors, with the return on capital eventually being reinstated
at the original value. In line with this reduction in capacity, the
price of energy, measured in natural units, will also move back to-
wards its initial level. There are therefore two opposing effects:
(a) increased demand for energy generated by the short-run reduc-
tion in energy prices that results from temporary overcapacity in
energy supply sectors, and (b) the long-run expansion in energy
demand as the short- run capacity constraints in the energy using
sectors are relaxed. Allan et al. (2007) and Turner (2009) find that
(a) dominates (b) so that the rebound value in the short run is
higher than in the long run.
But this result depends partly upon the flexibility of short-run
prices in the energy sector which reflects, at least partly, the as-
sumption of uniform perfect competition imposed in the CGE
models used in Allan et al. (2007) and Turner (2009). However,
post-Keynesian macro-models argue for the adoption of sticky
prices in an imperfectly competitive setting. Further, the UK energy
market exhibits a particularly high degree of concentration, espe-
cially at the local level. The sector is frequently criticised in themedia and public policy debate for price rigidity, particularly in a
downwards direction. The existence of such rigidity would under-
mine the rationale for a high short-run rebound. In terms of policy
implications, understanding the potential price response of energy
suppliers is likely to be crucial in understanding what the wider
economy response and, thus, rebound effects, of any energy effi-
ciency in any given timeframe may be.
We extend Turner's (2009) analysis by considering the extent to
which rebound values are affected by the flexibility of energy prices.
As far aswe are aware this is the first rebound analysis that explicitly al-
lows for price inflexibilities in the energy supply industry. Further, we
study the entire evolution of the rebound effects, not simply their
short- and long-run values. This highlights the sensitivity of the re-
bound value to the precise period in which that measurement takes
place and the possible non-monotonic change in energy use following
an increase in energy efficiency. These have potentially important result
for energy policy.
4. Price stickiness
There is an extensive literature on potential sources of inflexibil-
ity that inhibit instantaneous price adjustment to changes in demand
and supply conditions. Such price stickiness typically involves some
form of imperfect competition that affords firms an element of price-
setting power. Traditionally, these ideas were based on pragmatic
considerations and a degree of empirical evidence. For example,
Hall and Hitch (1939) suggested widespread use of a mark-up pric-
ing model, according to which prices were marked up over marginal
costs plus some contribution towards fixed costs. Further, in view of
its potential significance, there has been considerable efforts to es-
tablish theoretical micro-foundations involving price (and wage) in-
flexibility for New Keynesian macroeconomics. Earlier Keynesian
approaches were regarded as incomplete, content to take significant
wage and price inflexibility simply as a stylised fact. But the presence
of evenmodest menu costs can give rise to significant price rigidities.
These are transactions costs associated with changes in prices, anal-
ogous to changing the menus in restaurants.
A second consideration is that large firms typically set prices in a
way that would broadly be regarded as fair. Therefore Okun's (1981)
notion of “customer”markets, as opposed to auctions, provides a further
rationale for firms deviating from conventional short-run profit
maximising behaviour, thereby providing a check on rapid price adjust-
ments. If the firm sees its relationship with its customers as important,
rapid price changes risk being considered unfair. They undermine cus-
tomer confidence and encourage their switching to an alternative sup-
plier. Indeed, many prices are subject to agreed contracts that run into
the future and are therefore inherently “sticky”, although the degree
of stickinessmaywell be sensitive to the importance of the fundamental
reasons for price inflexibilities.
Oligopolistic market structures have long-since been regarded as
subject to limited price competition. Fear of rivals' reactions to any indi-
vidual firm's price changes can act to inhibit the latter, although, of
course, the oligopolistic motivation for price stickiness is not dependent
on the very special assumptions of the kinked demand curve model
(Sweezy, 1939).
These sources of price inflexibility are not necessarily competing
and, in practice, price inflexibility could reflect the impact of a range
of influences. We are particularly concerned here with prices in the
UK wholesale and retail energy markets. This is the price of energy de-
livered to UK end users for household and industrial use and in such
markets a number of these considerations are germane.6 The market
is oligopolistic in structure with widespread concern about the fairness
of any price adjustments. This arises initially among consumers,
Fig. 1. The structure of production.
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spills over into political sensitivity about substantial price adjustments.
The market is therefore subject to significant levels of regulation. These
considerations inhibit the kind of instantaneous responses of prices to
supply and demand changes that are presumed in conventional models
of perfectly competitive markets.7
Evidence of price stickiness in energy markets has been found in
a number of empirical studies. For instance, Bachmeier and Griffin
(2003), Farkas and Yontcheva (2019) and Mirza and Bergland
(2012) look at the impact of price changes in the US, Hungary and
Norway in the wholesale market in responses to changes in costs.
They find that there is often a lag in the transmission of cost changes
to end user prices. This is especially true in the case of costs
reduction.
In the case of the UK, commodity price stickiness is identified in
studies by Bunn and Ellis (2011) and Millard and O'Grady (2012).
These include some evidence of price inflexibilities in energy mar-
kets. However, due to data limitations, their work focuses on prices
in the markets for petrol and diesel and therefore does not present
a complete picture of price stickiness in the domestic utility
market.
In a CGE modelling context, there has been some exploration of the
impact of wage inflexibility (see, for example, Böhringer et al., 2013;
Dixon and Rimmer, 2011; Partridge and Rickman, 2010). However, no
study has focussed on price inflexibilities for a produced product, espe-
cially in the context of energy industries.8 Accordingly, in this paper we
augment our energy, economy, environment CGE model, UKENVI, to
capture such behaviour in the energy sector. While there is empirical
evidence that supports the presence of price inflexibility in general,
and for energy prices in particular (for example Bunn and Fezzi,
2008),we donot estimate suchmodels here. Ratherwe explore the sen-
sitivity of rebound effects to variation in the degree of energy price
stickiness.5. The CGE model
We simulate the economy-wide and sectoral impacts of improving
energy efficiency in all production sectors of the economy using a variant
of the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model UKENVI. This is a
modelling framework constructed for the analysis of economic distur-
bances to the UK economy, where the ENVI version is specifically de-
signed to study the effects of energy and environmental policies. In the
following sections we provide a description of the main characteristics
of the model.95.1. Consumption
In this paper we adopt the myopic version of UKENVI in order to
ensure comparability with Turner (2009).10 Consumption in any
period, Ct, is a linear homogeneous function of real disposable in-
come. In each time period, households consume a vector of energy
and non-energy goods and services. The energy goods comprise
electricity, gas, coal and oil. Households consume both domesti-
cally produced and imported goods, where imports are combined7 Other potential sources of price stickiness seem less relevant. For example, the capital
intensity of the energy industry suggests that wage inflexibility is unlikely, in itself, to be a
major explanation of energy price inflexibilities.
8 In CGE modelling, adjusting the price of a domestically non-produced input, such as
labour or imports, is muchmore straightforward than intervening in the price adjustment
of a domestically produced good.
9 A full mathematical description of the model is provided in Appendix B.
10 We have run an alternative scenario inwhich forward-looking agents determine both
investment and consumption expenditures. In both themyopic and forward-looking sim-
ulations the short-run and transition path results are qualitatively similar and converge to
the same long-run equilibrium.with domestic goods under the Armington assumption of imperfect
substitution (Armington, 1969).
5.2. Production and investment
The production structure is characterised by a capital, labour, energy
and materials (KLEM) nested CES function.11 As shown in Fig. 1, the
combination of labour and capital produce value added, while energy
and materials form the intermediate inputs. In turn, intermediate and
value added combine to generate total output in each sector. Intermedi-
ate inputs are either produced domestically, or imported.
Intermediate composites are produced by a CES combination of en-
ergy (E) and non-energy (NE) inputs:
Vi;t ¼ δVi ∙E
ρVi
i;t þ 1−δVi
 
∙ 1þ ψð Þ∙NEð Þρ
V
i
i;t
h i 1
ρVi ð7Þ
In Eq. (7), Vj,t us the output produced by each industry, j. ρiV is the
elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy inputs (sub-
script i indicatesN=1,….,I inputs produced by each domestic or exter-
nal industry). δiV is the share parameter, and ψ is the proportionate
change to energy efficiency.12
The short and long runs are conceptual time periods. In the short
run (period 1 of any period by period simulation) the capital stock
is fixed, both in aggregate and in its distribution between sectors.
The long run is the interval in which the capital stocks in all sectoral
are fully adjusted and equal to their desired levels. When the pres-
ent myopic model is run in period-by-period mode, each sector's
capital stock is updated between periods via a simple capital stock
adjustment procedure, according to which investment equals de-
preciation plus some fraction of the gap between the desired and
actual capital stock.13 This treatment is wholly consistent with sec-
toral investment being determined by the relationship between the
capital rental rate and the user cost of capital. The capital rental rate
is the rental that would have to be paid in a competitive market for
the (sector specific) physical capital: the user cost is the total cost
to the firm of employing an additional unit of capital. In sectors
where the rental rate exceeds the user cost, desired capital stock
is greater than the actual capital stock and there is therefore an in-
centive to undertake net capital investment. A process of capital re-
duction occurs in sectors where rental rates fall below user costs.
The resultant capital accumulation (reduction) puts downward11 We set the elasticity of substitution to 0.3 and the Armington elasticity to 2 as in
Turner (2009). This ensures the comparability of results. The sensitivity of results to a
range of elasticity values is tested extensively in Turner (2009), Section 5.
12 ψ is initially calibrated to be equal to zero. In the simulations reported in Section 6 we
set ψ to 0.05 to replicate a 5% increase in energy efficiency.
13 This procedure is compatible with a simple theory of optimal investment behaviour
given the assumption of quadratic adjustment costs.
Table 1
The short and long run impacts of a 5% stimulus to energy efficiency in production (for a
range of λ values).
Time period Short run Long
run
λ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 1
GDP 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.54
CPI −0.01 −0.05 −0.11 −0.18 −0.23 −0.27 −0.54
Investment 0.72 0.81 0.91 1.03 1.11 1.20 0.66
Employment 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.46
Unemployment rate −2.91 −3.31 −3.79 −4.39 −4.74 −5.15 −8.66
Nominal wage 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.63 0.26 0.36
Households
consumption 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.60 0.63 0.65 0.83
Exports 0.31 0.38 0.45 0.54 0.60 0.66 1.08
Price of energy −0.51 −1.11 −1.85 −2.76 −3.31 −3.93 −3.32
Price of non-energy 0.02 0.00 −0.02 −0.04 −0.06 −0.08 −0.39
Household energy 1.01 1.61 2.34 3.27 3.84 4.49 3.73
Household non-energy 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.68
Intermediate energy −3.85 −3.63 −3.36 −3.02 −2.81 −2.58 −2.68
Intermediate
non-energy 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.37 0.39 0.43 0.75
Total energy use −2.57 −2.25 −1.86 −1.36 −1.06 −0.72 −0.97
Investment energy −3.98 −3.94 −3.87 −3.79 −3.74 −3.67 −0.88
Investment
non-energy 0.76 0.84 0.94 1.07 1.14 1.23 0.67
Sectoral rebound
impact 23.01 27.39 32.78 39.58 43.71 48.46 46.30
Economy wide
rebound impact 29.71 38.41 49.13 62.67 70.88 80.35 73.36
5G. Figus et al. / Energy Economics 86 (2020) 104657(upward) pressure on rental rates and so tends to restore equilib-
rium. In the long run, the capital rental rate equals the user cost
in each sector, and the rate of return to capital is equalised between
sectors.
5.3. Energy prices
As argued in Section 2, both theoretical considerations and empirical
evidence suggest that energy prices in the UK are likely to be sticky.
However, standard general equilibrium models assume that at any
time period prices equal the desired market clearing level,14 which is
equal to themarginal cost. In the UKENVI model, the energy price is de-
fined generically as follows:
pet ¼ pet wt ; rkt ;prt ;pmð Þ ð8Þ
In Eq. (8),w is the nominal wage, rk is the capital rental rate, pr is the
price of domestic intermediate and pm is the price of imported interme-
diates, which is the numeraire. To illustrate the importance of stickiness
in price adjustments we assume that there are quadratic adjustment
costs associated with any price change. This is implemented by replac-
ing Eq. (8) with the following:
pet ¼ λpet þ 1−λð Þpet−1 ð9Þ
Eq. (9) implies that in any time period, t, the energy price is the
weighted sum of the current market clearing price from eq. (8) and
the price in the previous period, t − 1. The simple partial adjust-
ment mechanism indicates that the energy price adjusts only grad-
ually to its desired market-clearing level. The value of λ can vary
between zero and one. Where the value is unity product prices
are fully flexible, whilst where λ approaches zero they become al-
most rigid along the transitioning path. The empirical evidence is
not sufficiently compelling to allow us to attach a specific value to
λ and, in any case, we wish systematically to explore the impact
of the degree of price flexibility on the measurement of rebound ef-
fects. Accordingly, we simulate across a range of values of λ and
track the impact on rebound.
5.4. The labour market and wage bargaining
In the labour market, the real wage,
wt
cpit
, is determined by Eq. (10):
ln
wt
cpit
 
¼ φ−ϵ ln utð Þ ð10Þ
There is extensive empirical evidence for this wage curve specifica-
tion. The standard justification for which is that the real wage is deter-
mined by the bargaining power of workers which is stronger when
the rate of unemployment, u, is low (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005).
The parameterφ is calibrated to the steady state and ε the imposed elas-
ticity of the wage rate with respect to the rate of unemployment
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994). We assume that the population is
fixed throughout, making the analysis again consistent with Turner
(2009).1514 We use the term “desired market clearing” because in each time period the energy
markets do clear in the sense that industry suppliers meet the demand at the price set.
There is no rationing. However, this is not a short-run profit-maximising output for indi-
vidual firms and the price is not the short-run competitive price.
15 The population could be updated endogenously by introducing migration between
the UK and the rest of theWorld. Our assumption of a fixed population is standard in na-
tional CGE models.5.5. Data and calibration
The primary source formodel calibration is theUK Social Accounting
Matrix (SAM) for 2010. We follow a common procedure for dynamic
CGE models which is to assume that the economy is initially in steady
state equilibrium (Adams and Higgs, 1990). The UKENVI model has 30
separate productive sectors, including 4 main energy supply industries
that encompass the supply of coal, refined oil, gas and electricity.16
We also identify the transactions of UK households, the UK Govern-
ment, imports, exports and transfers to and from the rest of the World
(ROW).
The SAMconstitutes the core dataset of theUKENVImodel. However
other parameter values are required to inform the model. These often
specify technical or behavioural relationships, such as production and
consumption function substitution and share parameters. Such param-
eters are either exogenously imposed - based on econometric estima-
tion or best guesses - or determined endogenously through the
calibration process.
5.6. Simulation strategy
We introduce an exogenous 5% permanent step increase in the
efficiency of energy used in production by all industries in period 1.
This is done by setting the parameter ψ in Eq. (7) to 0.05. The effi-
ciency stimulus is applied to the energy composite at the lowest
level of the production hierarchy shown in Fig. 1. In each simula-
tion the model is then run forward for 50 periods (years). In one
set of simulations the increase in energy efficiency is applied to
all sectors simultaneously. Results are reported for the short- and
long-run values for a set of key energy and economic variables
over a range of values for the energy price stickiness parameter
λ. The time paths of intermediate and total energy use rebound
values are also shown. We then follow exactly the same procedure
but introduce the increase the energy efficiency in each individual
productive sector so that 30 sector specific sets of simulations are
performed.16 See Appendix A, Table A.1 for the full list of sectors and the corresponding sectors in
the 2010 UK IO table.
17 Wedonot report the results for the value ofλ=0. In that case, the energypricewould
essentially be set exogenously. This leads to problems of rationing when costs or demand
conditions change, an issue beyond the scope of the present paper and not germane to the
rebound literature.
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The impact of the energy efficiency shock on key economic and
energy aggregates is summarised in Table 1. Results are reported
for two conceptual periods: the short run and the long run. Recall
that the short run is the initial period after the efficiency shock,
where capital stocks are fixed both in aggregate and in their sec-
toral composition. The long run corresponds to the new steady
state equilibrium characterised by no further changes in sectoral
capital stocks.
For the short run, results from six variants of themodel are reported.
These are where the λ coefficient takes values between 0.2 and 1.0.
Whilst the speed at which the economy approaches long-run equilib-
rium does depend on the value of λ, the ultimate long-run figures do
not. That is, the speed of price adjustment generates no hysteresis ef-
fects so that all the models here converge on the same long-run solu-
tion. Consider first the long-run results.
6.1. Long-run impacts
The long-run economic impacts are reported in the final column in
Table 1, which are given, as are all the figures in this table, as percentage
changes from the initial values. The results are as expected following a
beneficial supply-side stimulus in the form of enhanced productivity.
There is an increase in competitiveness following the fall in production
costs so that exports rise by 1.08%. This, togetherwith substitution away
from imports, stimulates economic activity and there is also downward
pressure on domestic prices. GDP and employment rise by 0.54% and
0.46% respectively and there is an accompanying increase in total in-
vestment and consumption. The level of unemployment (and therefore
also the unemployment rate) falls by 8.66% so that the real wage in-
creases by 0.90% (given by the nominal wage minus the change in the
CPI, i.e. 0.36% + 0.54%).
Focussing on the total long-run energy use and its component el-
ements, a number of countervailing forces are in operation. First,
there is a 3.32% fall in the price of energy measured in natural
units, compared to the 0.54% fall in the consumer price index (cpi),
reflecting the energy intensity of energy production and the reduc-
tion in the price of other intermediate inputs. Therefore whilst en-
ergy efficiency in household consumption has not changed, the
relative reduction in energy prices means that household consump-
tion becomes more energy intensive. There is a 3.73% increase in the
consumption of energy by households, as against the increase in total
household consumption of 0.83%.
The price of intermediate energy, whenmeasured in efficiency units,
falls by a greater amount, 8.32%. This is the sum of the 3.32% fall in en-
ergy prices measured in natural units, together with the 5% increase in
efficiency. There is again a substitution of energy, in efficiency units,
for non-energy inputs, and there is also a general increase in economic
activity of around 0.5%. Both of these will increase the derived demand
for energy intermediates, when measured in efficiency units. However,
when these are converted to physical units, using Eq. (1), there is a re-
duction in energy use of 2.68%, just over a half of the 5% increase in en-
ergy efficiency in production. The net effect of the changes in household
energy consumption and intermediate energy demand is a reduction of
0.97% in total energy use. This result indicates that the general equilib-
rium demand for energy is relatively price-inelastic for our default pa-
rameter values.
Eqs. (3) and (4) can be used to derive the long-run rebound
values for intermediate and total energy use. These are calculated
as: RI = 46.30% and RT = 73.36%. There is a large difference between
the two values. Eq. (5) reveals that this hinges on the change in use of
energy in non-intermediate uses. Further, we have already noted
that there is a relatively large increase in household energy demand,
primarily driven by the fall in the price of energymeasured in natural
units.6.2. Short-run impacts: λ= 1
We begin by comparing the long-run results given in Table 1 with
the short-run figures where there is complete price flexibility. These
are the results for the value of λ= 1, which is the standard setting in
a CGE model. This means that we are comparing the entries in the
final two columns in Table 1. The first key observation is that there are
marked differences in the short- and long-run expansions of the econ-
omy. The economic expansion is smaller in the short run than in the
long run; short-run GDP, employment and household consumption
rise by only 0.17%, 0.27% and 0.65% respectively. In the longer term,
the expansion is enhanced as capacity constraints in energy using sec-
tors are removed and prices fall, further stimulating exports, household
consumption and investment.
These differences are important in terms of economic well-being
and would, other things being equal, lead to higher energy use in the
long run than in the short run. However, as described in Section 3,
there are price effects operating in the opposite direction. Energy and
non-energy prices fall by 3.93% and 0.08% in the short run. In the long
run, the absolute size of the energy price reduction is less, at 3.32%,
and the non-energy price reduction is greater, at 0.39%. The fall in the
short-run energy price partly reflects excess capacity, a situation that
unravels over time, whilst the price of non-energy commodities falls
over time, as capacity constraints are relaxed.
The short-run change in the energy/non-energy relative price differ-
ential from the base-year values shows a fall of 3.85% (3.93% minus
0.08%); in the long run this is reduced to 2.93% (3.32% minus 0.39%).
The incentive to substitute energy for non-energy commodities in con-
sumption and intermediate use is greater in the short run than in the
long run and this proves large enough to offset any effects of increased
activity. Thereforewith complete price flexibility, the increase in house-
hold energy use, at 4.49%, is greater in the short run than the long run.
Similarly, the short-run falls in intermediate and total energy use, at
2.58% and 0.72% respectively, are less than the long-run reductions in
the same aggregates. We therefore replicate with a later data set the re-
sults reported by Allan et al. (2007) and Turner (2009). Under standard
pricing assumptions, the short-run intermediate and total rebound ef-
fects, at 48.46% and 80.35%, are greater than the corresponding long-
run values.
6.3. Short-run impacts: λ b 1
In the previous sub-section we presented the conventional
short-run results. These derive from a simulation in which energy
prices are perfectly flexible and in each time period take their com-
petitive values. However, a key focus of the present paper is to de-
termine how far the short-run energy use results are affected by
energy price rigidity. This means comparing across the data columns
1 to 6 in Table 1, as the value of λ is gradually increased from 0.2 to
1.0.17
Again we begin with the aggregate economic figures. The impact
of varying the degree of energy price flexibility on the short-run per-
centage change in GDP, employment and household consumption is
limited. The smaller is λ, that is, the stickier energy prices are, the
lower is the short-run economic expansion, reflecting the more re-
stricted improvement in competitiveness. For example, the increase
in total exports is reduced from 0.66% when λ= 1.0 to 0.31% where
λ= 0.2. This in itself would reduce short-run energy use, and there-
fore rebound, as λ fell. However, more important is the change in rel-
ative prices, with energy prices falling by 0.51% at the lowest level of
price flexibility as against 3.93% at the highest. In fact for all values of
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Fig. 2. Percentage point difference between period by period and long run economy wide rebound from a 5% increase in energy efficiency in intermediate energy use.
18 Figures C1 and C2 in Appendix C provide a comparison between short- and long run
sectoral prices and outputs for values of λ equal to 0.1 and 1.0.
7G. Figus et al. / Energy Economics 86 (2020) 104657λ ≤ 0.8 the short-run relative reduction in energy prices is less than in
the long run. This has the implication that for λ ≤ 0.8, both interme-
diate and total energy savings are now greater in the short run than
in the long run.
In the bottom two rows in Table 1, the final column translates this to
report the long-run rebound values for industrial (sectoral) and total
(economy-wide) energy use. As stated earlier, the long-run sectoral
and total rebound values are 46.3% and 73.36% respectively. The first
six columns of Table 1 give corresponding short-run rebound values
as the λ value increases. The key result is that when λ ≤ 0.8, the short-
run rebound is lower than the long-run rebound. That is to say, with a
slower price adjustment in the energy sector, the apparently anomalous
result that the rebound is greater in the short run than the long run no
longer holds. The most extreme case recorded in Table 1 is for λ =
0.2, where the economy-wide rebound is 29.7% which is 43.7 percent-
age points smaller than the long run.
6.4. Evolution of energy use
It is interesting to explore the entire time path of rebound effects,
rather than simply compare short- and long-run figures. We therefore
report period-by-period values for energy rebound and sectoral rates
of return on capital so as to focus on the entire evolution of these vari-
ables. We begin with economy-wide rebound results which are
shown in Fig. 2. This plots the difference between the economy-wide re-
bound figure in each period and the long-run figure; that is to say, if the
value in Fig. 2 for any time period is positive (negative), the rebound in
that period is greater (less) than the long-run value. The different curves
represent the results for different values of λ, varying between 0.2 and
1.0.
Consider, first, the case of perfect price flexibility, λ= 1.0. In pe-
riod 1, economy-wide rebound is at its short-run level of 80.35%,
6.99% above the long-run value of 73.36%. Over time, capacity in
the energy sector falls, limiting the extent of the reduction in the
energy price. This operates quite rapidly initially so that, for exam-
ple, the period 2 price of energy is 3.65% below the initial level, ascompared to 3.93% in period 1. On the other hand, the price of
non-energy commodities continues to fall as capacity in energy
using sectors expands. These relative price movements reduce the
incentive for substitution towards energy. This means that the
economy-wide rebound moves monotonically towards the long-
run value and is very close by period 7.
The changes in capacity reflect, and are reflected in, changes in
the sectorally disaggregated rates of return on capital over time.
These are shown in Fig. 3 for the simulation where λ = 1. Note
that in period 1, sectors in the energy supply chain, namely mining
and quarrying, other mining, crude petroleum, electricity transmis-
sion and distribution, and gas all have rates of return well below
their base-year values. All other sectors experience an increase.
Overtime, these rates move smoothly back towards their initial
values. This is brought about through a gradual expansion of capac-
ity in the non-energy sectors, combined with a contraction of ca-
pacity in the energy sectors. In aggregate, economic activity is still
increasing.18
Any energy price stickiness limits the initial fall in energy prices
in response to overcapacity in the energy sector. This reduces the re-
bound values in the early periods. Where the degree of stickiness is
high, so that the value of λ is low, the impact of the excess capacity
is effectively suppressed; where λ is closer to 1, the situation is
more nuanced.
In the simulation that uses a value for λ of 0.6, we observe a gradual
fall in the price of energy from a reduction of 1.85% in period 1 to a de-
cline of 3.32% in the long run, together with a slow reduction in non-
energy prices. Fig. 2 therefore reports a gradually increasing rebound
value over time as capacity constraints are reduced in non-energy sec-
tors. When λ takes the value 0.2, this gradual adjustment is even more
extreme, with it taking over 40 years for rebound to reach its long-run
value.
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Fig. 3. Sectoral rate of return to capital for λ= 1.
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non-monotonic. Whilst the short-run rebound is below the long-
run value there is subsequent overshooting as the economy adjusts
to the energy efficiency shock. For λ = 0.9, the initial rebound is
slightly below the long-run figure. However, continuing adjust-
ment in energy prices to overcapacity further stimulates the de-
mand for energy so that in period 2 the rebound is above, by 2.5-25.00
-20.00
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-5.00
0.00
5.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
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Fig. 4. Percentage point difference between period by peripercentage points, the long-run value. From period 3 onwards re-
bound falls smoothly, converging on the long-run value from
above. A similar pattern is apparent when λ = 0.8. Here in the
first two periods rebound is below, but subsequently above, the
long-run value.
Fig. 4 presents the evolution of rebound in intermediate energy
use, similar to the whole-economy figures represented in Fig. 2. The21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
λ=0.8 λ=0.9 λ=1
od and long run rebound in intermediate energy use.
9G. Figus et al. / Energy Economics 86 (2020) 104657patterns of change are broadly similar, although, as has already
been noted, both short- and long-run intermediate energy rebound
values are substantially lower. It is interesting to note that even
when λ = 1, rebound in intermediate energy use falls slightly
below its long-run value from period 3 and continues to fall until
period 5, after which it begins to rise, approaching the long-run
value asymptotically from below. The distinctive time path of
whole-economy rebound observed for λ= 0.9 is also apparent for
intermediate rebound. However, where λ = 0.8, the rebound
value now monotonically approaches the long-run value from
below.
It is clear from our analysis that a simple comparison of short-
and long-run values of both intermediate and total rebound ef-
fects is potentially misleading. It is of value to know the speed of
adjustment to the long-run values but also that the adjustment
paths may be non-monotonic, particularly where price flexibility
is high.
6.5. Sectoral rebound values
In the preceding sub-sections we have analysed in detail the
rebound results following improvements in energy efficiency
which apply simultaneously to all sectors of the economy. This is
primarily to set the work in the context of previous studies by
Allan et al. (2007) and Turner (2009). In this sub-section we
briefly consider whether the same factors apply where the effi-
ciency improvement occurs in just one sector. That is to say; is
the short-run rebound typically higher than the long-run value
and is this result sensitive to the degree of price stickiness in the
energy sector?
In order to test these propositions we introduce a 5% increase in en-
ergy efficiency in production in each sector, one sector at a time.We cal-
culate the short- and long-run all-economy rebound results, in a similar
manner as in Sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3. The rebound results for all 30 sec-
tors and for price adjustment parameters varying between 0.1 and 1.0
are reported in Table D1 in Appendix D.
In the conventional case, in which there is no price stickiness in
the energy market so that λ = 1, the short-run rebound is greater
than the long-run value in 26 of the 30 industries. The four indus-
tries where this is not the case are linked to the energy sector itself.
These sectors are: “Mining and quarrying”, “Crude petroleum, nat-
ural gas etc.”, “Other mining” and “Coke and refined petroleum
products”.
For all individual-industry simulations, reducing λ reduces the dif-
ference between the short- and long-run rebound values. For the 26 in-
dustries where the initial difference is positive, at some value of λ this
turns negative in 20 sectors. Those sectors which still have short-run re-
bound greater than long-run where λ takes its smallest value, 0.1, all
have differences that are very small. They are primarily service sector
industries.19 These results taken as a whole imply that the economy-
wide energy use response to energy efficiency improvements in two
thirds of all individual sectors is qualitatively similar to the response
to an aggregate efficiency improvement.
7. Conclusions
Whilst traditional neoclassical CGE models typically impose perfect
price flexibility, there are theoretical arguments and empirical support
for a degree of price stickiness in energy markets. Moreover, policy de-
bates reflect concern over a range of issues around energy pricing,
which suggests a need for revisiting fundamental assumptions
employed in CGE and other economic models. The novelty of the cur-
rent paper is the focus on the impact of price inflexibility in energy19 The sectors are: “Natural water treatment, etc.”, “Wholesale and retail”, “Transport
support”, “Services”, “Recreational” and “Other private services”.markets on the time-path of rebound in energy use, and to explain
this in the context of thewider economic expansion triggered by indus-
trial energy efficiency gains. This is an important lens for policy makers
to consider the wider impacts of increased energy efficiency through,
given that it may imply a requirement for coordinated planning across
policymakers, regulators, industry energy users and energy suppliers
in order to maximise both net economic gains and energy savings.
Our main results are as follows. First, where the energy price is per-
fectly flexible, then short-run rebound effects – both for intermediate
and total energy use - exceed their long-run values, confirming earlier
simulation findings. However, we also establish that this result depends
critically on the degree of energy priceflexibility. That is to say, the pres-
ence of energy price stickiness can overturn this result, reducing the
short-run rebound effects so that they become smaller than the long-
run effects.
Second, focussing only on the size of short- and long-run rebound ef-
fects omits potentially important detail on the full adjustment paths of
energy use. The scale of rebound effects exhibits systematic changes
over time that caution against the unguarded use of any estimate of re-
bound at a particular point in time to inform appropriate energy policy
responses. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that very short-runmea-
sures of rebound are likely to be unreliable indicators of ultimate
impacts.
Third, these results apply generally where the increase in energy ef-
ficiency applies only to one sector. In over 85% of all sectors the short-
run economy-wide rebound effects were greater than the long-run
values and in over 65% this was also reversed at some level of energy
price stickiness.
Fourth, and crucial in terms of the policy context of rebound re-
search, our analysis makes it clear that system-wide rebound effects in-
corporate essential macroeconomic phenomena that microeconomic
studies alone are unable to capture. Rebound effects depend on a
range of macroeconomic influences, including the degree of energy
price stickiness and the complex interaction of transactors, including
the energy and non-energy sectors and household demand. This is not
to dispute the fact that microeconomic analysis is essential, not least
to provide valuable evidence that may be used to inform appropriate
economy-wide model simulations in a systematic micro-to-macro
approach.
There are a number of straightforward possible extensions to our
analysis. First, particularly given the focus ofmany policy actions on res-
idential energy efficiency (including, but not limited to, impacts on fuel
poverty), it would be useful to extend our analysis to the efficiency of
energy use in consumption. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
the results show that the time path of rebound impacts depends cru-
cially on the interaction between simultaneously expanding and
contracting economic sectors. The work reveals that just changing the
speed of price adjustment in one key sector has an important impact
on the evolution over time of the economy's response. We wish to ex-
tend the work here to consider more widely variations in not only
price stickiness across sectors but also capacity adjustments. This
would be valuable for the analysis of both economy-wide and sector-
specific shocks.
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Table A1
List of production sectors in the UK- ENVI model, corresponding sectors in the 2010 UK IO tables, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.
Sector name SICA
M
C
O
Fo
D
T
P
C
C
R
Ir
E
M
T
E
G
W
W
C
W
La
O
T
A
C
Se
E
Rgriculture, forestry and fishing 01–03.2
ining and quarrying 05
rude petroleum and natural gas + coal 06–08
ther mining and mining services 09
od (and tobacco) 10.1–10.9,12
rink 11.01–11.07
extile, leather, wood 13–16
aper and printing 17–18
oke and refined petroleum products 19-20B
hemicals and pharmaceuticals 20.3–21
ubber, cement, glass 22-23other
on, steel and metal 24.1–25
lectrical manufacturing 26–28
anufacture of motor vehicles, trailers etc. 29
ransport equipment and other manufacturing 30–33
lectricity, transmission and distribution 35.1
as distribution 35.2–35-3
ater treatment and supply and sewerage 36–37
aste management and remediation 38–39
onstruction-buildings 41–43
holesale and retail trade 45–47
nd and transport 49.1–49.2
ther transport 49.3–51
ransport support 52–53
ccommodation and food and services 55–56,58
ommunication 59–63
rvices 64–82,97
ducation health and defence 84–88
ecreational 90–94
ther private services 95,97OAppendix B. The mathematical presentation of the UK-ENVI model
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Fig. C1. Sectoral output prices changes

